A Remote Administration Trojan (RAT) allows an attacker to remotely control a computing system and typically consists of a server invisibly running and listening to specific TCP/UDP ports on a victim machine as well as a client acting as the interface between the server and the attacker. The accuracy of host and/or network-based methods often employed to identify RATs highly depends on the quality of Trojan signatures derived from static patterns appearing in RAT programs and/or their communications. Attackers may also obfuscate such patterns by having RATs use dynamic ports, encrypted messages, and even changing Trojan banners. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework termed RAT Catcher, that reliably detects and ultimately blocks RAT malicious activities even when Trojans use multiple evasion techniques. Employing network-based methods and functioning in inline mode to inspect passing packets in real time, our RAT Catcher collects and maintains status information for every connection and conducts session correlation to greatly improve detection accuracy. The RAT Catcher re-assembles packets in each data stream and dissects the resulting aggregation according to known Trojan communication protocols, further enhancing its traffic classification. By scanning not only protocol headers but also payloads, RAT Catcher is a truly application layer inspector that performs a range of corrective actions on identified traffic including alerting, packet dropping, and connection termination. We show the effectiveness and efficiency of RAT Catcher with experimentation in both laboratory and real-world settings.
Introduction
Remote Administration Trojans (RATs) are malicious pieces of code often embedded in legitimate programs through RAT-ification procedures [31, 55, 43] . They are stealthily planted and help gain access of victim machines, through patches, games, E-mail attachments, or even in legitimate-looking binaries [31, 6] . Once installed, RATs perform their unexpected or even unauthorized operations [57] and use an array of techniques to hide their traces to remain invisible and stay on victim systems for the long haul. For instance, RAT-ified versions of programs Unix ps and Windows taskmgr.exe keep RATs from appearing in the list of active processes; moreover, by modifying system configurations including the boot-scripts and the Registry database, RAT-binaries often survive system reboots or crashes. A typical RAT consists of a server component running resulting aggregations against protocols followed by Trojans, our RAT Catcher morphs data streams into sequences of Trojan messages, facilitating the application-layer inspection and classification of malicious traffic. A number of options are available to manipulate identified RAT sessions ranging from simple alert and log generation to packet dropping and pro-active session blocking/termination. Experimentation with the RAT Catcher shows its effectiveness as well as its efficiency in a range of laboratory and real-world application settings. We organize our paper as follows: Section 2 outlines related work and Section 3 discusses the working mechanisms of RATs. Section 4 presents our proposed framework and Section 5 outlines the findings of our prototyping effort and experimental evaluation. Concluding remarks and future work can be found in Section 6.
Related Work
Upon activation, a RAT inherits privileges of its program-carrier and complies with the program's expected behavior most of the times, making it challenging to distinguish legitimate activities from malicious ones solely based on program ownership and user profiling [31, 27] . Verifying that a program is virus-infected is known to be computationally impossible [12] ; even searching an executable for known RATs is challenging. The "least privilege principle" is considered an effective way to limit the potential access-scope of Trojanized programs in mulit-user systems [45, 24, 22] even though it is routinely violated [24, 26] . Techniques such as "partitioned protection domains" and "multi-level security models" are also used as means for protection against Trojans [4] ; in the former, system partitions provide discretionary access control and in the latter each system entity is statically assigned a security classification [37, 10] . In this context, a Trojan may only obtain information either within the same partition or from entities tagged with lower security classification, thereby limiting its potential damage. Preventing users in different protection domains from sharing programs can work together with integrity models † that compute and store checksums for all files in the systems, and periodically re-calculate these statistics to detect possible file modifications [35, 58] . Such security procedures often affect the flexibility of a system and are deemed as burden to users.
Fault-tolerance methods have been used to detect unexpected behavior of program segments by treating such deviations as errors [34] . Changes in size, frequency of modification, and ignition rates of programs in conjunction with user profiles [20, 39, 56] have been used by AVs to detect viruses and RATs [18, 14] . To survive system reboots or crashes, RATs modify system files such as win.ini, system.ini, and/or registry entries in Windows and boot-scripts in Unix systems. To help detect and prevent such systemlevel modifications, a number of host-based security systems allow users to directly enable/disable startup items [38] . Unfortunately, this helps little as it is difficult for users to distinguish legitimate from illegal items and RATs often resort to renaming themselves. Parasitic RATs inject their malicious codes into running processes on-the-fly, effectively shielding themselves from detection [43] . For instance, Trojan Beast inserts itself into active processes such as winlogon and Explorer and becomes a background thread in these programs [47] . Most security systems fail to deal with parasitic RATs as in their effort to curb suspicious activities, they kill legitimate processes as well [47] . A group of RATs can disable firewalls and AVs by killing processes or removing files needed by such security systems [47] . Clearly, the above host-based detection methods may be ineffective as contemporary RATs can readily defy their access control, integrity checking, and behavior profiling.
RAT servers typically listen on specific ports waiting for instructions from attackers [15] . Utilities such as netstat, Fport and TCPView Pro are designed to monitor active ports for suspicious network activities [15, 33, 49] . A number of firewalls also detect Trojans by searching for applications inducing unauthorized communications. This general approach however may yield false negatives as RATs may bind to legitimate programs and use standard ports [38] . Overall, the effectiveness of techniques based on "static" Trojan characteristics is questioned as soon as RATs commence using non-default ports, hijack ports from other applications, and/or occasionally change communication ports.
By inspecting network traffic and searching for possible Trojan patterns, IDSs/IPSs can establish the intention and/or behavior of data streams [44, 51] . The telltale patterns of Trojans are typically obtained via reverse engineering and data mining techniques [52] . Most IDSs/IPSs heavily base their Trojan-detections on fixed ports and/or simple pattern matching mechanisms, inevitably generating significant false positive or negative rates. Also, this pattern matching is typically conducted only within individual transport-layer TCP/UDP packets rendering IDSs/IPSs vulnerable to evasion attacks [50] . To mitigate evasive attacks, some IDSs/IPSs including Snort and protocol analyzer Ethereal offer traffic stream-reassembly functionality. Unfortunately, this re-assembly feature is only available for pre-specified ports reducing the defense capabilities of such systems significantly [44, 23] . Ethereal is mainly designed as a protocol analyzer that passively collects network traffic without generating any alert for ongoing traffic making it impossible to deliver counter measures in real time [23] . Furthermore, most network-based anti-Trojan systems identify only RAT control channels and do not deal with the content of data channels producing elevated false negative rates [7] . In summary, conventional RATs detection techniques demonstrate limitations and may fail to identify Trojans that resort to a range of advanced evasion techniques.
Characteristics of RATs
As RATs can essentially capture every screen and keystroke, intruders may obtain account information, passwords, and sensitive computing system data. RATs can also spawn arbitrary numbers of processes on specific TCP/UDP ports, impersonate victims, redirect traffic for specific services to other systems, and launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In this section, we examine the salient features of RATs and briefly analyze their capabilities.
Frequently Observed Functionalities of RATs
RATs typically provide attackers with comprehensive command repertoires for file management, process scheduling, and system configuration manipulation. File management features include potentially destructive operations such as delete/move a file or directory on victim systems. The process scheduling component in a RAT permits intruders to create, view, and/or terminate running processes at will. The configuration manipulation element allows RATs to alter the behavior of the victim system by for instance disabling its security features after modifying the Windows Registry. RATs can often operate as device controllers being able to open/close CD-ROMs, disable the mouse and network cards, intercept keystrokes and/or screen snapshots, flip the victim's screen or change its resolution, monitor password dialog boxes and clipboards, capture audio/video of the victim's environment, and finally, crash the victim [43] . The re-direct feature of RATs allows an attacker to chain various services together and ultimately forward the results to a specified destination, making it trivial for intruders to hijack network connections, intercept private data, and inject fake messages. By functioning as packet sniffers, RATs can also monitor a victim's network activities and determine its topology. Furthermore, by scanning the entire system of the victim machine, including its garbage bin, a number of RATs can collect personal information such as user accounts, passwords, credit cards, and Email addresses.
Most RATs integrate all the above functionalities and therefore act as a swiss army knife for intruders. In this spirit, Back Orifice (BO), SubSeven, and DeepThroat provide around 60, 100, and 120 commands, respectively. Table I A number of RATs offer the proxy functionality that turns a victim machine into a server for services including Telnet, FTP, HTTP, ICQ, and IRC, offering free storage and complete anonymity for attackers. The Trojan Eclypse for instance can be instructed to act as a FTP server; this is depicted by the sample traffic of Table II , which establishes separate channels on different TCP ports for its control and data transmissions much in the spirit of FTP. The apparent protocol similarities in both syntax and semantics between Eclypse and FTP make it difficult to distinguish normal FTP-flows from Trojan-generated traffic.
The traffic of Table II shows that the data channel is constructed dynamically (in row 9) once the client submits command NLST to obtain a list of files from the compromised machine (row 8). Clearly, the data channel is server-initiated although the request is clientoriginated and the data port of the client is specified with command PORT dynamically (row 6). Similarly, SubSeven can be configured to act as a proxy server with the help of commands FTP, URL and COM (Table I) [43, 42] . Prior to being delivered, RAT-servers may be named as software patches or games with the corresponding binders, tricking users into downloading, un-bundling, and finally, executing such malicious programs. Once the servers are configured, they are shipped to victims via a number of delivery channels as described in Figures 1 and 2 . During their installation, RAT-servers may piggyback themselves to other legitimate programs, termed hosts, so that they are executed every time their hosts are invoked. In this way, a BO2K-server can install itself as a thread to the host program IEXPLORE.EXE [42] . RAT-servers typically run in the background and listen on designated network ports waiting for attacker-issued instructions, leaving victims unaware of their damaging activity.
There is a multitude of avenues to spread Trojans to victim machines as Figure 2 depicts; the most notable for the time being are Instant Messengers (IM) and peerto-peer (P2P) systems. With the help of either MSN-messenger or KaZaA, an attacker may freely visit chat-rooms, scan buddy-lists, or even randomly select candidate victims among encountered active users, and subsequently deliver RATs to victims. Additional delivery options include HTTP servers especially created to disseminate Trojans along with regular web-pages, opening Email attachments, execution of malware and distributions for software patches, freewares, and/or games. Hence, anti-Trojan systems are easily defeated if their RAT-detection methods cover only a small portion of such propagation channels.
The IP addresses, TCP/UDP ports, access passwords, and other information of RATservers can be obtained by intruders through feedback channels shown in Figure 1 . IM/P2P systems, Email services, and shared folders can even provide auto-notifications between RAT-servers and clients. In Guptachar [43] for example, an attacker may set up an IRCserver via its IRCBOT ‡ function by providing a login account nickname; every time a compromised system is activated, it connects to the above IRC-server using nickname to upload the victim's IP-address and port number. Furthermore, most RATs resort to multiple methods to outlive system crashes or reboots and evade AVs/IPSs/IDSs [43] . By editing ‡ Internet Relay Chat Robot Registry entries, modifying system files such as win.ini, system.ini and autoexec.bat as well as inserting items on the startup folders, RATs can easily "hide" and be transparently triggered on every reboot. In this regard, host-based detection methods are inferior to their network-based counterparts as far as RAT detection ic concerned.
Encrypted RAT Traffic
RATs such as Back Orifice (BO), BO2K and NetBus v2.0 encrypt their traffic flows to defeat security systems that base their RAT detection on pattern matching techniques. The first half of Table III shows portion of encrypted traffic generated by Back Orifice (BO). The scrambled content of encrypted RAT communications forces many anti-Trojan systems to predominantly use fixed network ports (e.g., the UDP-port for BO is configurable with default 31337), inevitably leading to false positives/negatives. In BO, the encrypted traffic is generated by applying an XOR operation on the original data and a random stream created with the help of a four-byte encryption key derived from the intruder-specified password § . At the receiver side, the seed (i.e., key) can be guessed via an exhaustive search due to its short range; this seed can then be used to recover the original traffic [42] . Obviously, the XOR operation neither changes the length of the original message nor destroys string patterns; this fact may help identify the BO even if its encrypted traffic is only available. Table III . Back Orifice generated traffic in both encrypted and decrypted formats § its default value is 31337, the same as its default UDP port.
Through exhaustive search, we can recover the seed 2160 used in the BO-server/client traffic of Table III . The decrypted traffic demonstrates that each BO message commences with the 8-byte magic-string of *!*QWTY? followed by the 4-byte packet length, 4-byte packet ID, 1-byte message type, the variable length message data and the 2-byte checksum field. The packet length specifies the size of the entire message; for example, the first client message (row 1) is 19-bytes in length. Initially, the BO-client probes the server with command PING (0x01 in the 1-byte message type at index 16) to check the availability of the server. The active server responds with command PONG along with its version number in row 2. In rows 3 and 5, the client requests information from the victim (i.e., the BO server) with commands PROCESSLIST (0x20) and INFO (0x06). Table III shows that decrypted BO traffic possesses strong message structure and clear semantics. This structure in conjunction with the commands of Table I help attain improved traffic identification based on decrypted content, which is the main techniques used in our RAT Catcher to detect BO; a similar approach was also employed by Snort.
The XOR-based encryption algorithm used by the international version of BO2K can be also reverse-engineered and the original traffic can be recovered, making BO2K detection feasible. Nevertheless, the use of plugin modules in BO2K complicates matters. To this end, the plugins enc aes, enc cast and enc idea encrypt BO2K traffic with the AES, CAST, and IDEA encryption algorithms respectively [46] . It has been shown that such algorithms are resistant to sophisticated differential and linear cryptanalysis techniques [1, 30] . Hence, it is impossible to recover original form from encrypted traffic without the requisite encryption keys. For this type of Trojans, the only pragmatic approach for detection has to be based on the RAT external behavior which involves monitoring of message sizes, handshake procedure, and traffic correlation between the two traffic streams within each RAT session. [29] is a noteworthy Trojan in that it uses proprietary encryption algorithms but still offers opportunities for detection based on traffic correlation; it listens to default but reconfigurable TCP-port 20034 and supports plugins enabling the integration of new functionalities [36] . Each NetBus Pro message has a fixed-length header (i.e., 10 bytes) consisting of string "BN" followed by four 2-byte fields namely, message-size, versionnumber (typical value 0x0002), unknown (often a random number), and command-code fields. The variable-sized data section follows the header and its size is specified in the message-size field of the header. Table IV shows a portion of NetBus Pro(v2.0)-generated traffic. Apparently, the beginning of every message is readily determined by string "BN"; correspondingly, the end of the message can be resolved from the message-size field of its header. Multiple messages may be packed in a single TCP packet as is the case with row 5, each of which can be identified through payload content inspection and message structure analysis. Stream-based inspection can also correctly interpret NetBus Pro messages spanning multiple TCP packets. Also, inspection on both streams of a session to ensure their conformance with NetBus Pro protocol specification further improves the detection accuracy. Despite the fact that decryption of RAT traffic is not always feasible, techniques derived from dissecting protocol syntax of RATs combined with analysis of patterns found in message exchanges can be exploited to detect Trojans. The NetBus Pro protocol analyzer outlined by Algorithm 4 of Section 4 functions on this premise.
Diversified Use of Protocols by RATs
By and large, the proliferation of RATs can be attributed to the fact that existing RATs serve diverse constituencies and deliver substantially differentiated services using a multitude of transport protocols. For instance, NetBus, Socket de Troie and SubSeven use TCP while Back Orifice, DeepThroat and DeltaSource are UDP-based. As RATs evolve they also use different protocols. In this regard, BO2K uses both TCP and UDP even though its ancestor BO was exclusively UDP-based. The syntax and semantics of client-server messages also demonstrate diverse characteristics. RATs including Back Orifice, SubSeven and BO2K maintain well-formed binary message structures; on the other hand, Trojans such as Dolly and Frenzy follow text-based message formats. Last, some RATs including Eclypse, WanRemote and Drat uses syntax and semantics similar, if not identical, to the standard FTP, HTTP, and Telnet protocols.
In Table II , we show portion of the traffic generated by Eclypse, an FTP-based Trojan and Table V presents traffic generated by WanRemote [43] that clearly follows the HTTP specification in both directions [25] . For brevity, we do not show the HTTP headers of all messages from the server but only the first one in row 2. Server responses are embedded in the data sections of HTTP messages. Table V Table V . WanRemote(v.3.0)-generated traffic HTTP(v.1.1) and the server uses HTTP(v.1.0) forcing each command to be transported using a separate TCP connection. For example, the packet of row 1 has TCP-source port 1071 while the corresponding source ports for messages in rows 3 and 5 are 1089 and 1105, respectively. By placing different commands in HTTP requests, the client can perform various operations on the victim's machine via the Trojan server. To this effect, the attacker can traverse directories in victim's file system with request "cd=C:/" (row 3) and obtain designated files with command "get=C:/" (row 5). Through "kill=" of row 9, the attacker calls for the termination of a process at the server that reciprocates with status information in row 10. The apparent pattern "WANRemote 3.0" definitely helps detect individual WanRemote(v.3.0) sessions; moreover, the correlation between different sessions (i.e., inter-session correlation) can further improve the detection accuracy.
Drat is a representative of the Telnet-based Trojans in which the server echoes back any attacker input and respective pieces of output as Table VI shows. Acting effectively as a command interpreter, the Drat-server displays the prompt D:/temp> waiting for instructions from the attacker as row 3 indicates. Rows 5, 7 and 9 depict the echoes of the three characters in command dir entered by the attacker in rows 4, 6 and 8; the character-by-character transmission and echo-back mechanism are typical of the Telnet protocol and together provide a reliable way to identify such traffic. We combine together all packets that convey the client's command "run c:/windows/notepad.exe" and show them in the row marked 13-41; the 42-70 line depicts the respective echo activity. Clearly, the attacker mistakenly types ran for the desired run command and later uses "backspace" (0x08) to correct the mistake. By making available editing functionalities, Drat provides a true interactive environment. However, it poses a challenge for security devices that detect RATs based on patterns as the latter can be readily evaded by inserting an arbitrary number of edition keys such as backspace, delete, and/or empty spaces. An anti-Trojan system Table VI . Drat(v.1.0)-generated traffic has to simulate shell functionality and act as a command interpreter, should it successfully identify Telnet-based RATs. Such banner adaptations make it more difficult for security systems to detect with a single fixed signature the traffic generated by various versions of DeepThroat operating simultaneously. Sending decoy messages is another popular evasion technique. By doing so, Trojans such as Doly attempt to induce security systems to generate large numbers of false positives [43] , forcing the security officers to spend considerable periods of time examining logs. The latter produces a good chance for the intruders to go undetected. A Doly client attempts to establish a TCP connection with a victim by trying ports 3456, 4567, 5678, 6789 ¶ , 7890, 9182, 8374, 2345, 7654, and 27559 in sequence four times regardless if a RAT is present. This activity resembles to port scanning which is typically graded as a low-severity surveillance activity by AVs/IDSs/IPSs and is frequently ignored by security officers. Although RATs often operate on their default ports, they can be configured to use ports in either the privileged or non-privileged range. While experimenting with real traffic, we observed that RATs mostly employ port hopping techniques and servers use arbitrary ports selected on the fly readily defeating port-based detection approaches. Hence, a contentbased approach would be by far more fruitful in detecting Trojans using decoy messages, dynamic port hopping, and other evasion techniques. ¶ Doly's server default port.
Presence of Multiple Evasion Techniques in RATs

A Framework for Apprehending RATs
Conventional security systems use add-on modules and/or specially-crafted signatures to identify malicious RAT activities and are unaware of RATs unique characteristics. To address these shortcomings, we propose an extensible framework named RAT Catcher that employs network-based detection methods, operates in-line, and manipulates RATtraffic in real-time. We base our design on the following constraints: i) RAT-servers are implanted on victim machines through the channels discussed in Section 3.2. Through its real-time operation, our framework puts emphasis on detecting RAT communications as opposed to conventional AVs and host-based security systems that mainly focus on the Trojan installation process [14] ; and ii) features of sought RATs including format of messages, handshake procedures, and functionalities are available typically via reverse engineering, behavior analysis, and data mining techniques [53, 2] . By tracking the progress of all established connections initiated by either normal applications or Trojans, our framework conducts data correlation between different sessions or traffic streams, performs stateful inspection, and identifies abnormal and/or deviating behavior in realtime. Our RAT Catcher stores packets in every data stream, re-assembles them together and the resulting aggregations are subjected to protocol dissection according to standard TCP/IP specifications as well as the syntax and semantics of individual Trojans. In this way, our framework performs layer-7 or application-level inspection and can effectively combat evasive mechanisms used by RATs. As soon as a session is verified as Trojan, our framework can immediately take corrective steps by logging, blocking, terminating the connection or simply taking over the session.
Design Rationale and Architecture for the RAT Catcher
To remotely control a computing system, an attacker should first set up either a TCP or UDP channel with the RAT server implanted on the victim machine. A TCP session is defined by its distinct connection and disconnection processes [15] . The former is a threeway handshake procedure where the initiator (or client) starts a connection with a TCP SYN packet and the recipient (or server) replies with a TCP SYN-ACK packet which in turn incurs an ACK packet from the initiator. The disconnection procedure typically involves a four-message exchange with each side dispatching a TCP FIN packet and corresponding acknowledgments from the two ends. Evidently, a specific TCP connection can be uniquely identified by the tuple <client-IP, client-port, server-IP, server-port>. Similarly, a specific UDP session is also identified by a similar four-element tuple with its termination often designated with a time-out mechanism. Any change in the above tuple implies a new TCP/UDP session. Overall, a connection can be represented with the extended tuple <client-IP, client-port, server-IP, server-port, protocol> where protocol can be either TCP or UDP. Within each session, two data streams exist, one from originator (or client) to recipient (or server) and the second in the opposite direction. Each data stream within a session can be identified with a four element tuple < IP s , P ORT s , IP d , P ORT d >, where IP s and P ORT s are the IP address and network port of the source and IP d and P ORT d are their destination counterparts.
Messages exchanged between a Trojan server and client are generated in accordance to the RAT's own syntax rules and semantics and are shipped following the constraints of TCP/UDP transport protocols. The latter may not respect the Trojan's message boundaries, therefore, inconsistencies between Trojan message borders and transport packet demarcations are unavoidable. The transport layer may also deliver packets in an arbitrary order and the original data stream can be only recovered via reassembly by its recipient. For instance, the TCP packet of row 5 in Table IV For all established connections originated by either normal applications and/or suspected-Trojans, RAT Catcher maintains session records, including information of connection initiator and recipient, messages exchanged, and application type of the session. Such session information is not only maintained during the lifetime of a session but also remains accessible beyond its lifetime as part of a history repository. The capability of tracking the state of each active session facilitates stateful inspection, intra-session data fusion, and inter-session correlation for Trojan-generated traffic. With the help of stored information, we can also determine the progress of a session. For instance, information on connection status can indicate whether a TCP session is in the three-way handshake procedure, has established connection, or is at its termination phase. By correlating the data of streams within the same session, RAT Catcher can rapidly determine whether an attacker's operations are successful. In addition, by correlating the information from prior sessions with an ongoing connection, a RAT data channel could be readily associated with its control channel, thereby prompting the same preventive/punitive action by the RAT Catcher. Furthermore, we use the information of defunct sessions stored in the history repository for carrying out session correlation computations that help determine the traffic type of currently active sessions. The storage of all transport packets facilitates their remapping to Trojan messages by the packet re-assembly procedure that takes place with the help of the syntax and semantics of known Trojan protocols. The objective of this aggregation also known as Message Sequencing, is to conceal the packet demarcation imposed by the transport layer and restore the boundaries of Trojan messages. Without sequencing, Trojan sessions may go undetected if their constituent messages happen to span multiple transport packets. Given the large number of existing RATs and the variety of protocols used, it becomes challenging to identify a RAT session effectively and efficiently. To classify data streams, the RAT Catcher resorts to multiple techniques that include traffic correlation, application protocol analysis, and stateful inspections in addition to fine-tuned signatures. Once a session is confirmed as Trojan, our framework may immediately block, terminate or take over the session besides log generation. Figure 3 shows the architecture of our framework that entails the following modules:
Session Correlator (SC), Message Sequencer (MS), Traffic Distinguisher (TD), and Trojan Terminator (TT).
Once a packet P arrives at the RAT Catcher, the Session Correlator (SC) module determines whether there exists a session S in which P belongs to; if there is none, a new session S is created for P . Based on information about S or correlation with other active or defunct sessions, it may be possible to immediately determine whether P is part of a RAT such as Back Orifice, SubSeven, NetBus, or DeepThroat. P is then handed over to the Message Sequencer (MS) along with its session information S, where P is re-assembled with other existing packets of the same stream to form a sequence of application messages. In turn, this message sequence is transferred to the Traffic Distinguisher (TD) to determine the specific application type of the session. Finally, P arrives at the Trojan Terminator (TT) where information on S is appropriately updated, P is stored in S to help forthcoming re-assembly efforts and a corrective action may be taken if RAT traffic has been found.
Session Correlator (SC)
To maintain information for each session, we use the session data structure whose key fields are shown in first part of Table IX . Each connection is assigned a session structure and is uniquely identified by its first five fields: source and destination IP addresses (SIP, DIP), source and destination port numbers (SPORT, DPORT) and protocol (PROTO). Field TYPE indicates the application type of the session such as DeepThroat, NetBus, WanRemote etc.; this field can assume the value bypass, should the application type cannot be determined after a certain amount of traffic in the session has been inspected or the session is generated by a normal application. The field CONFIRM indicates whether the value in TYPE has been derived from correlating streams in both directions of the same session, obtained by association with other sessions (active or zombie), or simply drawn based on different messages in a uni-directional traffic. Clearly, should a session application type be drawn using multiple criteria -data streams, sessions, and correlations-the classification accuracy is improved. The two data streams in a session, the one from client to server and its reverse counterpart are stored in fields CLIENT and SERVER respectively; these pointers to stream structures are discussed in Section 4.3.
field name size (bytes) description
Key fields of the session data structure Figure 4 shows an hierarchical structure termed active sessions table that we use to organize session pertinent information; it provides efficient session insertions, retrievals, deletions, and facilitates intra-session and inter-session correlations. We first use a hashtable to group sessions with hash function H(SIP,DIP,PROTO)=((h>>16)xor (h>> 8)) mod h size where auxiliary function h is defined as h=(SIP xor DIP xor PROTO), ">>" is the right shift operation, and h size is the size of the hash table. In computing the hash value, SIP, DIP, and PROTO are treated as integers with protocols TCP and UDP assuming values 0x06 and 0x11 respectively. Although simple, function H has exhibited near-uniform distribution in our experiments. Next, each hash-table entry points to a splay tree T that complies with the binary search tree property and attains an amortized time by moving a tree node closer to the root every time it is accessed [48] . Clearly, frequently accessed elements are more likely to be closer to the root.
A splay tree T anchored off each entry of the hash table helps organize all sessions that present the same hash value. In our framework, each node in T represents all connections established between a source/destination pair described by fields SIP, DIP and PROTO of the structure session (of Table IX ). More specifically, every node of T is associated with a port mapper consisting of two tables; one organizes the ports (SPORT) used by SIP and the other stores ports (DPORT) used by DIP. If a port number is active and occupied by a session, the appropriate record for the session is stored in the corresponding slot of the port mapper. Multiple connections sharing the same port number are organized with a linked-list under the slot indicated by the port number. Finally, all session specific data are maintained in the session pool of Figure 4 and are organized as linked-lists as well.
To facilitate session retrieval, we designed function session-find(P , wildcard) whose goal is to locate the session S that packet P belongs to. This function initially searches the active session table with the help of data in tuple <SIP, SPORT, DIP, DPORT, PROTO> available through P . If the outcome is an existing session S, P is client-initiated and S is marked by SC as having forward direction "DIR: forward"; otherwise, SC looks up the Figure 5 . Session information after data channel is established for traffic in Table VIII active session table again with a new tuple <DIP, DPORT, SIP, SPORT, PROTO> formed by exchanging the roles of source and destination ends. A non-empty result S in this second attempt indicates that P is part of a server-originated stream tagged with direction "DIR: reverse". The wildcard argument of session-find() specifies whether wildcard matching is conducted in the session lookup. By assuming value "source-port" or "destination-port" for parameter wildcard, session-find() considers any active source or destination port to be a match. Should wildcard be designated as "none", an exact port match is performed. Algorithm 1 outlines the three-step operation SC carries out. First, the function call session-find(P ,none) is used to extract the session S corresponding to packet P by traversing the active session table; a non-null S indicates that P belongs to an existing session and SC simply exits by returning S. Next, SC verifies whether P initiates a new session that acts as a data channel associated with an existent RAT control channel. Finally, the application type of the newly created session S for packet P is set by correlating S with active/defunct session tables.
We use the DeepThroat traffic of Table VIII as an example to describe the procedure followed by SC. The traffic segment indicates that the attacker establishes two UDP sessions with 2140 and 3150 as their corresponding destination ports; the former acts as the command channel and the latter as the data channel. By routing the traffic of Table VIII to our RAT Catcher, SC creates session <A,60000,V,2140,UDP> immediately after packet at row 1 is encountered. When SC deals with packet P of row 2, the invocation of session-find(P , none) yields session <A,60000,V,2140,UDP> whose mark "DIR: reverse" indicates P to be a server-originating packet. We assume that after processing the first two packets, the SC records information on session <A,60000,V,2140,UDP>,
Algorithm 1 Procedure followed by Session Correlator (SC)
1: P is a newly arriving packet; SIP and DIP are the source/destination IP addresses of P ; sport and dport are the source/destination ports of P ; PROTO is the protocol of P ; 2: find S associated with P in active session table by calling function session-find(P , none) 3: if (S is not null) then 4: return S and exit; 5: end if 6: find session T in the active sessions table with function call session-find(P , destination-port); 7: if (T is not null) then 8: if dport of session T is any, replace it with that of P , return T and exit; otherwise, create a new session S for P with tuple <SIP,sport,DIP,dport,PROTO>; fields TYPE and CONFIRM of S are set to the same as T ; return S and exit; 9: end if 10: create a new session S for P with tuple <SIP,sport,DIP,dport,prot>; 11: find session T in the defunct session table with tuple <DIP,dport,PROTO>; 12: if (T is not null) then 13: set TYPE of S to that of T and return S; 14: end if constructs the session table of Figure 4 and tentatively marks the session as DeepThroat. When the packet in row 4 is encountered, the RAT Catcher establishes that no session <A,60000,V,3150,UDP> exists as evidenced by Figure 4 . Before creating a new session <A,60000,V,3150,UDP>, SC looks up in the active sessions table for any session matching <A,60000,V,any,UDP> with the help of the call session-find(P , destination-port). By checking the type of the session in the lookup result, <A,60000,V,2140,UDP>, the RAT Catcher establishes that a DeepThroat control channel indeed exists and therefore marks the newly created session as DeepThroat ( Figure 5 ). Algorithm 1 carries out this session correlation between RAT control and data channels in lines 6 to 9.
Information about terminated or zombie sessions, especially those recently torn down, may be helpful to determine the application type of currently active sessions. For example, if a service provided on a specific network port of a host identified with the tuple <DIP,DPORT,PROTO> has been determined as a Trojan server by some previous sessions, its application type is not expected to change abruptly. Based on the above observation, our RAT Catcher keeps information about zombie sessions of Trojan servers accessible for a period of time -configurable but set to 5 minutes by default-and such zombie sessions are organized in the defunct session table with key of <DIP,DPORT,PROTO> and value of TYPE. Any time a new session <SIP,SPORT,DIP,DPORT,PROTO>, is generated by the SC, the defunct session table is consulted with query <DIP,DPORT,PROTO>, and the application type of the returned session, if any, is assigned to the newly created session. For instance, by the time RAT Catcher processes the connection beginning at row 3 of Table V , session <A,1071,V,80,TCP> has become zombie and therefore, it is stored in the defunct session table. By simply searching for <V,80,TCP> in the defunct session table, the application type of the session established by row 3 of Table V can be quickly determined as WanRemote. Such a correlation between ongoing connections and alreadyknown zombies can establish relevant temporal session associations and rapidly identify the application types of ongoing sessions.
Message Sequencer (MS)
We design the stream structure -key elements of which appear in the lower part of Table IX-so that packet re-assembly and state tracking for a data stream can be easily carried out. Different types of information are stored for connection-oriented and connectionless channels. For TCP streams, field state tracks the connection state of its originator and can be SYN-SENT, SYN-RCVD, ESTABLISHED, or CLOSE; fields ISN and next-seq maintain the initial sequence number and the next expected sequence number, respectively. Last, data is a pointer to an interval-tree [17] used to organize all encountered stream packets according to a search key [n 1 ,n 2 ] where n 1 , n 2 represent start and end sequence numbers; the value of every interval-tree node is a single packet of the stream in question. In a UDP stream, the data points to a buffer that stores data received but unprocessed for the stream in question thus far, whose size is indicated by field data-size. The field total-size indicates the number of bytes transmitted helping track the volume of data encountered by the session. We define function call stream-find(S, P ) to retrieve the stream I corresponding to packet P within session S.
The Message Sequencer uses an interval-tree I, implemented as a red-black tree to store stream-pertinent data. The key [V s , V e ] of a specific node V in I represents the start and end sequence numbers (SSN and ESN) of the corresponding packet P ; V s can be directly obtained from field sequence number of P 's TCP header while V e can be derived with the help of the fields total length, IP header length as well as TCP header size of the packet. For UDP streams, we simply assign the current value in total-size of the stream as the start sequence number (SSN) of the incoming packet and its ESN can be derived from SSN and the packet size. For any two packets P and Q of the same stream, we define different relationships based on their sequence intervals. By denoting P s and P e as the start and end sequence numbers for P as well as Q s and Q e for Q respectively, we can determine that: a) Q is a duplicate of P if P s =Q s and P e =Q e ; b) P and Q overlap if P s <Q s and Q s <P e < Q e or Q s <P s and P s < Q e <P e ; c) P contains Q if Q s >P s and Q e <P e or Q contains P if P s >Q s and P e <Q e ; and d) P precedes or follows Q if P e <Q s or P s >Q e , respectively. With the help of these interval relations, we design functions to manipulate the interval tree: interval-insert(I, P ) inserts a node representing packet P into I, interval-delete(I, P ) removes the node of packet P from I, and interval-retrieve(I, P ) returns a pointer to a node Q of the tree I provided that a duplicate, overlap, or containment relationship between Q and P can be established; otherwise, the outcome is a NULL. Evidently, these operations maintain complexity O(log(n)) where n is the number of nodes in I. In addition, the function packet-build(I, SSN, ESN) creates and returns a new packet Q with interval indicated by [SSN, ESN] . Finally, function interval-traversal(I) performs an in-order tree walk of I and lists all intervals (i.e., packets) in sorted order by their SSN; this function is useful for logging packets into permanent storage.
The stream re-assembly process used by MS is presented in Algorithm 2 and works as follows: for an arriving packet P , MS obtains the session S of P and function streamfind(S, P ) is invoked to fetch its stream I. Next, MS checks the freshness of P by calling
Algorithm 2 The procedure followed by Message Sequencer (MS)
1: P ← incoming packet; S ← session of P returned by Session Correlator (SC); I ← stream-find(S, P ); 2: if (TYPE and CONFIRM of S are set) then 3:
P is part of a RAT or normal session; hand it over to the protocol analyzer indicated by TYPE or Traffic Terminator (TT); exit; 4: end if 5: Q ← interval-retrieve(I, P ); 6: if (Q is empty) then 7:
P is a brand new packet and function interval-insert(I, P ) is used to add P into I; 8: else 9:
check whether the overlapping parts of P and any packet in Q have the identical contents; if not, generate alerts and exit; 10: end if 11: ts← initial sequence number (ISN) of I; te← (sequence number of Q)+(payload size of Q), where Q is the packet with largest sequence number in I 12: if ((te -ts) is larger than M AX SIZE (default M AX SIZE=5 KB)) then 13:
TYPE and CONFIRM of S are set to be bypass; and exit; 14: end if 15: O ← packet-build(I, ts, te) and is handed over to Traffic Distinguisher (TD) function interval-retrieve(I, P ), which returns a pointer to node Q of tree I. A NULL Q implies that P is a new packet and can be inserted into I with the help of function interval-insert(I, P ). If P and Q are duplicates, their payloads are compared to ensure that Figure 6 . Traffic Distinguisher (TD) components they have identical content before P is inserted into I with a different timestamp. In a similar manner, for cases where P and Q overlap and either P contains Q or Q contains P , their contents on the common sequence interval are compared; if they share the same content for the overlapping part, P is inserted into I since P is a normal overlap packet or retransmission of Q; otherwise, P is suspicious as it may have been crafted with evasive tools and administrator-specified counter measures such as dropping can be applied. Finally, function packet-build(I, SSN , ESN ) is called, with SSN the initial sequence number of the stream I and ESN the largest sequence number thus far in I, to re-assemble the data stream and the resulting aggregation, termed super-packet O, is handed to the Traffic Distinguisher (TD) module.
Traffic Distinguisher (TD)
As every Trojan follows its own protocol, it would be unrealistic to use a monolithic mechanism for detecting all possible RATs. The Traffic Distinguisher (TD) module addresses this challenge by using a multi-phase traffic classification scheme. First, all incoming traffic is categorized by the Traffic Classifier (TC) into four general types of streams: HTTP, FTP, Telnet and Miscellanea. Subsequently, each type is handled by its own traffic Dissector. In the Miscellanea Dissector, we employ specific Trojan analyzers to detect streams that potentially belong to RATs using proprietary protocols as such Trojans hardly manifest any commonalities. Figure 6 shows the TD components and their organization. Traffic Classifier (TC) component mainly employs heuristic rules to classify traffic. For every incoming packet P , along with its session S, stream I, and the superpacket O constructed by module Message Sequencer (MS), TC determines the traffic type of P with the help of the following rules:
1. packet P is client By and large, RAT streams that are transported via the same protocol appear to be very similar except in their use of ports, banners, and server-replies received. For instance, all FTP-based Trojans such as Eclypse (Table II) and HellDriver use TCP-ports for their control and data channels and their server use banners that differ only in content. For example, the Eclypse banner is "220 EclYpse 's FTP Server is happy to see u !" and that of HellDriver's is "220 ICS FTP Server ready". Although FTP-compliant RATssupport different command sets, they overall follow the FTP specification. Based on these observations, our RAT Catcher detects FTP-compliant RAT types by mainly using their server-banners and client-command sets. As soon as the banner and command set of a newly-established FTP-based RAT become available, RAT Catcher can successfully identify the Trojan in question through proper augmentation of the FTP Dissector. This also applied to HTTP and Telnet-compliant RATs as well. Algorithm 3 shows the overall operation of the FTP Dissector; the dissectors for Telnet and HTTP are laid out similarly. Algorithm 3 treats Algorithm 3 Procedure for FTP Dissector 1: P is the newly arrival packet, S and I are session and data stream that P belongs to O is the re-assembled "super-packet" 2: if (I is from server to client of session S) then 3:
O is split into multiple lines demarcated by |0D 0A|, banner is assigned the first line 4:
for (each banner telltale of FTP-based RATsidentified by RAT Catcher) do 5:
match banner against telltale and TYPE of S is set to the RATtype corresponding to telltale if a match is found 6: end for 7: else 8:
O is split into multiple lines demarcated by |0D 0A|, command is assigned the first token of the first line separated by empty space 9:
if (command is PORT) then 10:
calculate port number pt based on the parameter of the PORT command -refer to Table II for calculation  formula; create a new session with tuple <DIP,any,SIP,pt,TCP>, where SIP and DIP are the source/destination IP addresses of P 11:
end if 12:
for (each command instruction used by FTP-based RATs) do 13: match command against instruction and CONFIRM of S is set if a match is found 14:
end for 15: end if 16: P is handed over to Trojan Terminator (TT) FTP command PORT in a special way as this command specifies the port used for the data channel. A pseudo-session <DIP,any,SIP,pt,TCP> is created where SIP , DIP are the source/destination IP addresses of the packet in question, and pt is the port number specified in command PORT. As the network port that would be used by Trojan server data channel in the near future is yet unknown, a placeholder any is used instead.
The function of Miscellanea Dissector is inherently different from that of its counterparts in Figure 6 as it attempts to detect proprietary RAT communication protocols that hardly demonstrate any commonalities. This dissector essentially acts as a scheduler for all registered analyzers whose objective is to dissect exclusively proprietary protocols. For each incoming packet P , Miscellanea Dissector invokes in sequence all RAT-analyzers that have been implemented and incorporated in our framework. The process continues until the application type of P is either determined or all RAT-analyzers have been used with no outcome.
Algorithm 4 Protocol Analyzer for NetBus Pro
1: P is the newly arrival packet, S and I are session and data stream that P belongs to O is the re-assembled super-packet 2: verify that O is at least 10 bytes in size and starts with string "BN", otherwise, exit from the procedure 3: len = O [2, 3] , that is, the second and third bytes of O; version = O [4, 5] ; code = O [8, 9] 4: check conditions ((size of O >= len) and (version = 2) and (code < 200)) satisfied; otherwise, exit from the procedure 5: if (I is from server to client of session S) then 6:
TYPE of S is set to NetBus Pro 7: else 8:
CONFIRM of S is set and a NetBus Pro session is detected 9: end if 10: P is handed over to Trojan Terminator (TT) Analyzers within the Miscellanea Dissector share similar working mechanisms and Algorithm 4 shows the skeleton of the NetBus Pro analyzer. In brief, Algorithm 4 first finds boundaries of RAT-messages from the re-assembled super-packet O provided by module MS. In particular, Algorithm 4 inspects whether super-packet O satisfies the minimum message size of 10 Bytes and starts with telltale "BN" as necessitated by NetBus Pro specification. It then examines whether the restored messages yield NetBus Pro traffic. This is done by extracting well-defined fields including message-size, version-number, and command-code and tentatively marking the flow as NetBus Pro. Finally, Algorithm 4 uses the first server-message to confirm the initial marking by the first client message and set the field CONFIRM.
Trojan Terminator (TT)
The Trojan Terminator (TT) module of the RAT Catcher allows for counter measures to be taken for different types of detected RATs. The TT module examines the application type of a received packet P in conjunction with the status of its session S and stream I and take administrator-specified actions for the various types of traffic. If fields TYPE and CONFIRM of session S are not set, TT simply forwards P to the next hop enroute to its destination. Otherwise, TT uses a number of options including alert generation, logging of P as well as its data stream I and session S, blocking of subsequent messages from the same session, and/or take-over by acting as a RAT server to the initiator of the session. Information shown in Table IX for session S is also updated based on P to help subsequent re-assembly operations and improve the accuracy of RAT Catcher.
In addition, TT can become more proactive by disabling identified RATs. In particular, it may remove all Trojan-related components from the victim's file system. For instance, NetSphere has a unique feature that allows for the purging of its server through the client-command KillServer. The command <KillServer> issued by the NetSphere client forces the server to disconnect itself from the network; in addition, the server un-installs itself from the victim system by removing all NetSphere pertinent files. Similarly, Trojan GateCrasher also provides commands "uninstall;" and "end;" to terminate the execution of servers and purge from victim machines all pertinent files. By simulating the roles of RAT-clients, our TT can take over confirmed Trojan sessions and purge RATs from victim machines. In the same manner, our TT can play the role of the RAT-servers, helping collect vital information about attackers without suffering the destructive consequences of RATservers. In order to take over a detected RAT session, the TT sends a TCP RESET packet or an ICMP destination unreachable message to the server. Subsequently, TT crafts fake replies for all client-generated commands, and record all input from the attackers. Finally, it is worth pointing out that differentiated actions can be taken according not only on the RAT types but also on the transport protocols.
Experimental Evaluation of the RAT Catcher
We have implemented the proposed RAT Catcher in C as a subsystem in the IPS-module of FortiGate, a multi-function security protection system and a standalone network device providing firewall, AV, and IDS/IPS functionalities [32] . The modular architecture of FortiGate forms the basis for its extensibility and scalability, allowing for the seamless coupling of all our RAT Catcher-related components. In our experiments we used FortiGate-300 that operates in inline fashion, has 2 Gigabyte main memory, can manage prorated 400 Mbps traffic, and maintains upto one million concurrent network connections. We subjected the RAT Catcher to a wide range of experiments based on the testbed shown in Figure 7 with a number of test machines undertaking the roles of either RAT-servers or clients. Test machines run either Linux or Windows as a large number of RAT-clients and servers are available for these platforms. All test machines were connected to the FortiGate-300 via two switches supporting 100/1,000 Mbps ports: the first simulates the internal network where RAT-servers are found while the second switch plays the role of external network where various RAT-clients are operated by attackers. To verify the behavior of our RAT Catcher, we installed Ethereal traffic sniffers [23] -denoted as Sniffers in Figure 7 to capture data exchanges among RAT-clients, RAT Catcher and RAT-servers. In what follows, we report on our laboratory-based effort to establish the accurate operation of the RAT Catcher and baseline performance characteristics. We also report on the deployment and performance of the framework in actual networks.
Accuracy on RAT Detection
Our initial focus was on establishing the accuracy of our RAT Catcher in detecting Trojans that use either the HTTP, FTP, Telnet standard specifications or proprietary protocols with the help of the test environment of Figure 7 . We also intended to compare the behavior of RAT Catcher versus that of Snort, an open-source IPS that predominantly uses signatures for RAT detection [44] . In [9] , we discuss how Snort can be used for this purpose and outline specific rules. Every time we implanted a new Trojan server or client on a test machine, we re-installed the OS, network and regular applications of the machine in question to avoid any accidental interference. For all experiments we discuss in this section, the action taken by RAT Catcher on identified Trojan sessions is configured to be pass, meaning that the RAT Catcher only generates alerts for the detected RAT sessions and simply forwards all traffic. We proceed with our experiments in three stages with different test procedures: manual test, automated test, and tests designed specially for encrypted RATs.
In the manual testing stage, we initially installed all FTP-based Trojan servers identified by our RAT Catcher, including Eclypse, HellDriver, and Infector, then manually execute their corresponding clients and enter randomly selected RAT commands. Our RAT Catcher successfully identified all such Trojan communications and generated appropriate alerts. Next, we installed a subset of RAT servers of different types on a single test machine denoted as A, carefully configured each of them to avoid any conflict on communication ports, installation locations, clashing file modifications, and activated them Figure 8 . Testbed for RAT Catcher subject to synthetic traffic all simultaneously. By executing RAT client programs one at a time to communicate with their own servers on test machine A, our RAT Catcher revealed all Trojan activity. We observed the same accurate detection from the RAT Catcher when multiple RAT-clients were invoked at the same time. The RAT Catcher still achieved a perfect detection accuracy even when background or attack-free traffic generated by WU-FTPD co-existed during the testing. We successfully performed manual tests with RATs based on HTTP, Telnet, and proprietary protocols by repeating the above test procedure. Using the sniffers of Figure 7 , we captured all RAT traffic generated during this manual test stage and used it in forthcoming tests. Evidently, the large number of commands available in the repertoires of RATs renders manual testing very tedious and time-consuming. As every individual RAT command performs a well-defined operation and there is rarely dependency between different commands, a RAT server may not need to be "aware" of the sequence of client-issued commands and it is essentially memory-less. We exploit this memory-less characteristic to automatically generate test cases as follows: for each RAT under test, a session template (TCP or UDP) is first selected, then the template is filled with a sequence of appropriate command/response messages * * . The ensued traffic is injected into our RAT Catcher via a home-made IPS testing system [8] termed tester as shown in Figure 8 . The tester can be configured to manipulate the traffic before it is replayed to our RAT Catcher; this manipulation includes modification of protocol fields such as IP addresses, ports, checksums, and sequence numbers, replacement of packet payloads with arbitrary data, and/or re-shuffling packet orders.
For a TCP-based RAT connection, the session template consists of three parts: connection establishment, message exchange, and connection termination. The first part contains the three-way handshake procedure with three packets, client-initiated SYN, SYN|ACK from the server, and client's confirmation ACK. The message exchange part contains a series of "command/response(c/r)" pairs while the termination part is made up of two "FIN,ACK" pairs -one originated from the client and the second from the server. Clearly, packets in both connection establishment and termination have no payload and are fixed; packets in the message exchange part were generated automatically with the help of command sets and possible responses for the RAT under test. The UDP session template simply consists of a sequence of "command/response (c/r)" pairs specified by testers or automatically generated. Such sequences of commands are randomly chosen from the command sets for the RATs under testing. In addition, the number of RAT sessions to be created and the appearance frequency of each command in the generated traffic are configurable. To simulate multiple concurrent sessions, our tester can generate an arbitrary number of test cases, interleave them together, and shuffle the replay order before feeding into the RAT Catcher.
We employed SubSeven in the automated testing stage to show the detection accuracy of both RAT Catcher and Snort. Overall, we generated 100,000 of TCP-based SubSeven sessions; each session contained a random number -in the range of [1, 20] -of "command/reply (c/r)" pairs whose sizes and payloads were randomized unless specific format/parameter requirements are necessitated by the protocol. The generated RAT sessions were injected into both RAT Catcher and Snort. The outcome of the experiment appears in Table X . Sessions are grouped according to the number of their "command/reply (c/r)" pairs and column cnt shows the number of Trojan-sessions per group. Column noreply shows the number of sessions from each group that do not trigger any server-reply. Our RAT Catcher initially uses one or more messages of a session to determine the potential RAT type of the session which subsequently is confirmed by additional messages received. The two columns RAT Catcher detect and RAT Catcher confirm indicate the number of sessions tentatively labeled as Trojan and those confirmed as such by our RAT Catcher. Table X Table X shows that the RAT Catcher detects all SubSeven sessions and its overall confirm rate is nearly perfect. Only in the first group, a few instances of unconfirmed Trojan connections appear as single message-sessions offering no option for confirmation. Nevertheless, all SubSeven are properly tagged and only 2.43% of RAT-sessions cannot be confirmed. On the contrary, the accuracy of Snort is far from satisfactory with worst 1.95% detection rate for group 1, best 30.81% for group 20, and average 16.59% for all cases. This is attributed to the fact the Snort uses only three rules for SubSeven. Clearly, we could craft signatures in Snort to cover all SubSeven commands but this would greatly burden its operation and deteriorate its performance to an unacceptable level. We repeated our testing for traffic generated by FTP, HTTP, and Telnet-based Trojans using synthetic background noise with the layout of Figure 8 . We experimented with various intensities of background noise traffic regulated by the machines making up the noise generator and established very similar results to those shown in Table X .
In the last stage of our baseline experimentation, we dealt with Trojans that use encryption algorithms. As such RATs have extra dimensions of freedom-encryption algorithms and encryption keys-and share little commonality in their encryption processes, we designed special testing procedures that we discuss with the help of Back Orifice (BO)-and NetBus Pro-generated traffic. We used the Internet available source-code for the BOclient and changed its encryption seed for each newly created session. The various streams of ensued traffic -resembling that of Table III -were fed into both RAT Catcher and Snort. In all instances, RAT Catcher and Snort maintain the same detection accuracy as both resort to application-layer protocol dissection. While experimenting with NetBus Pro, we deployed a synthetic approach as NetBus Pro uses a proprietary encryption algorithm and its source code is not known. We generated the 10-byte application protocol header and randomly selected payload for every created NetBus Pro packet. We generated upto 1,000,000 NetBus Pro sessions and injected this synthetic traffic to both RAT Catcher and Snort. Our experiments showed that the RAT Catcher creates no false negatives achieving the perfect detection rate while Snort fails to recognize most of the generated sessions. Snort appears to be ineffective as it can detect only those NetBus Pro sessions that happen to have client-initiated and server-originated packets with sizes of 0x20 and 0x10 Bytes, respectively. In contrast, the NetBus Pro protocol analyzer † † of RAT Catcher treats the message-size field as a variable and therefore can recognize NetBus Pro messages of any size. Moreover, the RAT Catcher resorts to message structure analysis and correlation of bi-directional traffic within a session to further improve its detection accuracy. We have repeated the same approach in experimenting with combinations of RAT and attack-free traffic flows and obtained similar results for the performance of RAT Catcher and Snort. In summary, for Trojans based on HTTP, FTP, Telnet, or proprietary protocols, the RAT Catcher creates no false positives/negatives.
Scalability and Performance Under Various Workloads
As most RAT-clients are human-operated, the time gap between two consecutive commands submitted to the server is often long reflecting the attacker's thinking time. The time-stamped SubSeven message exchanges of Table VII indicate that this thinking time can be as long as 60 seconds -between messages 13 and 14-while on average is 40 seconds. This interactive nature of Trojans seems to indicate that processing overheads incurred by our RAT Catcher should not be a concern. However, as FortiGate is to be typically deployed at the edge between internal and external networks, it may often encounter in excess of half a million concurrent sessions and response times of corresponding sessions may be noticeably affected.
We evaluate the capabilities of the RAT Catcher under the above circumstances with the help of the testbed of Figure 9 and the traffic of Table IV . We use the latter as a template to generate various test cases and we split it into two parts: the first consists of the packets making up the normal TCP three-way handshake -not shown in the Table XI shows the results of all our tests conducted under diverse workloads. The RAT Catcher demonstrates the correct behavior when no artificial delays are introduced by the noise-generators regardless of the volume of RAT traffic and intensity of the background noise. When artificial delays are in place while replaying WU-FTPD packets, the RAT Catcher fails to generate the second required alert -confirmation marking-for a small number of Trojan sessions as we increase the volumes of foreground and background traffic. Nevertheless, even for this small fraction of sessions, RAT Catcher still carries out the tentative marking. Overall, there is no RAT session completely missed by our framework. In addition, we also manually verify that no background traffic is mistakenly identified as RATs or dropped due to RAT Catcher malfunction. In all cases, the latency for SubSeven traffic is statistically the same with and without RAT Catcher present in FortiGate. By repeating the aforementioned procedure with other RATs including SubSeven, DeepThroat, BO2K, and NetSphere we obtain similar results. 
The RAT Catcher in the Real World
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in a real world setting, we have deployed FortiGate-300 devices in three higher education institutions in France, P.R. of China and the U.S.A. In collecting network-traffic data, we used the layout of Figure 10 to store and forward both confirmed and suspicious traffic streams containing attacks to a corporate Threat Analysis Center (TAC) for manual processing and verification purposes. In order to help discover new types of attacks and better ascertain the false- RAT Catcher does not create any false positives/negatives and successfully blocks all identified RAT connections. Moreover, it typically determines the application type of a session after inspecting the first message from each direction of the session; so, it effectively forwards no attacker-submitted command and minimizes potential damage to victims. On the other hand, Snort detects all Back Orifice connections as it integrates a dedicated protocol dissector which performance-wise is equivalent to that of our RAT Catcher. However, Snort misses a number of NetBus and SubSeven connections, generating false negatives since the injected traffic has been manually evaluated to be malicious. For instance, Snort rule 3009 [9] used to identify NetBus Pro contains pattern "BN|20 00 02 00|" where the byte sequence "|20 00|" immediately following string "BN" designates the size of the message. Obviously, Snort rule 3009 assumes that all NetBus Pro messages with command-code 0x05 should be 0x20 bytes. However, the sizes of NetBus Pro messages with command-code 0x05 can vary in different sessions as demonstrated by the captured traffic shown in the first part of Table XIII ; this leads to a false negative by the Snort rules in place as the connection request from the NetBus Pro-client has size of 31 bytes (0x1F) instead of 32 bytes (0x20).
# dir payload description
NetBus Pro traffic -protocol: TCP; attacker denoted as A; victim denoted as V By replaying STL-collected traffic that has been manually verified as legitimate, we can establish that Snort also generates false-positives. For example, the second part of Table XIII shows a normal FTP session and its data connection for a file transfer. In message 1, the FTP-client requests "passive mode" which is approved by the server in message 2. At the same time, the server also informs the client of its intent to use the port 16959 for the data connection. In messages 3 to 5, a new TCP connection is established and subsequently used to deliver the content of the file commands.txt requested by the client in message 6. As the pattern PWD is part of the transported content of message 8, it triggers Snort rule 107 discussed in [9] which is obviously a false alarm. Overall, we have observed that RAT Catcher correctly identifies and subsequently blocks traffic streams known to be the result of RATs whereas Snort lags behind due to limited number of specific rules for each Trojan, yielding both false positives and negatives.
Conclusions and Future Work
A Remote Administration Trojan (RAT) is a malicious program that allows an attacker to remotely control a computing system often creating irrevocable damage. Existing techniques including fingerprinting, auto-start monitoring, surveillance of network activities and packet analysis using static signatures and/or fixed communication ports are limited in both scope and effectiveness. Today, traffic obfuscation, port hopping, file renaming and compression, information encryption along with evasion techniques work counter to the effectiveness and efficiency of anti-Trojan systems. In this paper, we propose the RAT Catcher, a network-based framework for Trojan detection that operates in inline fashion at the edge of the network and reliably identifies RAT activities.
The RAT Catcher inspects every passing packet and maintains information for the entire lifetime of sessions created by both Trojans and normal applications. This session tracking improves detection accuracy by providing stateful inspection as well as intra-session and inter-session data correlation. The RAT Catcher stores all packets in every data stream, reassembles them, and interprets the resulting data aggregations according to known Trojan protocols. To this end, the framework performs deep inspection on data streams by scanning protocol fields and whenever feasible message content. The RAT Catcher dissects both data streams within a session and correlates them in order to ensure that the traffic in both directions complies with protocol specifications defined by RAT systems in terms of syntax and semantics. By analyzing the syntax/format of application messages and inspecting the exchange order of messages between clients and servers, our RAT Catcher can defeat evasion techniques. By associating RAT control and data channels, correlating active with defunct sessions, and restoring boundaries of application messages through reassembly, the RAT Catcher does not generate false positives or negatives. Actions imposed on identified Trojan sessions include alerting, packet blocking, session take-over, and connection termination.
Experiments showed that the proposed framework is both effective and efficient. Subjected to comprehensive testing, the RAT Catcher demonstrated wide RAT coverage, excellent detection accuracy, and low processing overheads. We plan to further pursue our work in the area in at least three directions: first, we will keep enhancing our RAT Catcher so that it can deal with new types of Trojans as the latter become known; second, develop advanced techniques to identify RATs that use strong cryptographic mechanisms and finally, explore the integration of our RAT Catcher with other security systems including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware programs to more effectively combat aggregate malicious activities resulting from the mixture of RAT and popular worms known as Blended Threats.
